Danoz
10-05-2006, 03:56 PM
Morning :). I'm a student, I will be entering a graduate/PhD program in International Relations-- I thought maybe this could spark a good conversation. I'm interested in your opinion on this subject, since Jean-Luc picard once called the government appeal to "internal security" the tool of the oppressor for generations.-- Cheers!
National Security Agency; the Fight for Domestic Spying
By Daniel J. Porter
Every hour millions of transmissions make their way across our borders. In a millisecond any person from the warmth of their living room can converse with another on the opposite side of the globe, be it by cell phone, instant message, email or chatroom; technological advancements have created a world more interconnected than our ancestors could have ever imagined. As with every new technological breakthrough, the tools available today have the potential for great things—from connecting families separated by oceans and ensuring the safety of American troops to coordinating the execution of a terrorist bombing. The tool itself is without a moral compass, while its potential for destruction is readily accepted in the name of advancement. Clearly the need for regulation and protection exists, but at what point does the moderation become an infringement on an individual’s fundamental right to privacy? The role of intelligence agencies in a world confounded by the threat of terrorism creates the need to distinguish between the fine line of protection, and violation. The role of the National Security Agency has been questioned, and it appears a tug of war between critics of domestic spying and the Bush Administration may be in a stalemate that will inevitably find itself on the steps of the Supreme Court.
The mission is daunting, and it is stretched across the “NSA.gov†homepage, both for the comfort of the casual American and the warning to the potential enemy abroad. It projects a bold and clear mission statement; “[we have] The ability to understand the secret communications of our foreign adversaries while protecting our own communications -- a capability in which the United States leads the world...â€. Officially established five years after the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been improving ways to tackle this assignment for over half a century. Under a shroud of secrecy, the NSA enjoyed a place in foreign policy far away from the media’s limelight for many years; the U.S. Government and respective administrations publicly denied its very existence. Officials would even joke that the acronym stood for “No Such Agency†(Cauley, 2006). In recent years, however, media attention and public interest surrounding the now partially “declassified†agency has been substantial, as the NSA lives up to its vital role in the post-September 11th “War on Terrorismâ€.
The very beginnings of the agency date back to 1949 when the “Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)†was created and given jurisdiction over the “regulation of communications and electronic intelligence†(Richelson, 2005). The goal was to create an agency that would, in theory, coordinate the electronic intelligence and digital communications of the Armed Services (included under this umbrella was the Army Security Agency, The Naval Security Group and the Air Force Security Service). In practice, a lack of central command structure and internal competition rendered the AFSA fundamentally ineffective. This refusal (or arguably an inherent inability) to share information led to so much confusion during the Korean War that CIA director Walter Bedell Smith surrendered the issue directly to the National Security Council. This led to the creation of the NSA in 1952 (Bamford, 2001). By its very name, this expansion of the new program would stretch well beyond military intelligence—unifying these branches of cryptology and communications into one cohesive and highly secretive central agency.
Well before the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the NSA had been utilizing its surveillance programs to track rising threats in the War on Drugs and the impending War on Terrorism. Tapping into phones, computers and bank accounts was necessary to track terrorist cells and drug rackets to their very core. It is important to realize that the increasing escalation of technology that works to expand governmental surveillance power is often counterbalanced by equally innovative disruptive technologies and innovations by terrorists and drug traffickers. The improvement of scramblers and encryption methods are on the constant agenda of those who wish to elude government intelligence agencies (Forester & Morrison, 1994). The inherent defense is clear. If agencies like the NSA are straight-jacketed while their enemies continue their innovation unchecked, it is argued that dampening the NSA’s scope of surveillance in the name of public privacy carries with it a price tag of American vulnerability.
This is where the heart of the controversy begins, though it is hardly a modern one. In “The Republicâ€, Plato raises a question without conclusion, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes, which translates from Latin as, “Who will guard the guardians?â€. This question has rippled throughout history and remained largely unanswered, while the debate is as prominent as it was centuries ago.
Just as the ancients recorded the warnings of their greatest philosophers, our generation is certainly not void of thinkers who do the same. Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Ron Wyden argue that behind this shroud of secrecy “there is no guarantee that the most basic of freedoms will be preserved.†They continue in their report, “…the great fear we have for our democracy is the enveloping culture of government secrecy and the corresponding distrust of government that follows.†It is crucial to note, however, that the argument of public trust has not been lost on the NSA. National Security Director Michael V. Hayden contributes, “The American people have to trust us, and in order to trust us, they have to know about usâ€, recognizing the belief that the people of a nation have both the right, and the responsibility, to “watch its government closely and keep it on the right track†(Bamford, 2001).
One piece at a time, the shroud of secrecy that the NSA enjoyed was scratched away by Congressional hearings and other kinds of investigations into surveillance practices. The late 1990s brought criticism that the NSA had failed to adapt to the demands of “post-Cold War†technologies, and they were largely criticized for running a “global surveillance network†that people feared was affecting the individual privacies of people, not only in the United States, but around the globe (Richelson, 2005).
The tension in the domestic spying debate was amplified after September 11th, when the Bush Administration’s “War on Terrorism†hinged on the surveillance of all transmissions going in and out of the United States. Phone calls and voicemails became fair game for government spying. Agencies seized anything from bank accounts and credit card transactions, to scanning school records and library cards; many speculate that “predictive software†is being installed and run in government supercomputers, where mass amounts of personal data and associations are utilized to predict whether a person is likely to become a terrorist (Meyer, 2006). One thing is certain: Americans are largely skeptical about the role government has taken in the aftermath of 9/11 and many have become concerned that provisions in the US Patriot Act have granted the Executive Branch too much power without limitations and balance. It is no surprise that many of these provisions were initially supported by Congress, whose tendency to rally behind the President in times of crisis is anything but atypical. The wake of September 11th granted more than enough permission for the administration to take advantage and enhance these programs exponentially, forcing many critics in congress to be critical retrospectively (Hook, 2005).
One of the most prominent actors in the fight against the NSA’s domestic spying program is the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In June 2006, the ACLU represented several individuals who claimed they were being spied on by the US Government. Their argument maintained that the tapping of phone calls and obtaining of emails (including suspected terrorist affiliates) intentionally circumvented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—a court specifically created in the 1970s to avoid this kind of spying without judicial approval (Weinstein, 2006). The actual clients and their claims of victimization were largely irrelevant, because the ACLU argued that the previous public admittance by the administration of the program’s existence was enough to make a ruling on its constitutionality. They instead argued that the program was in direct violation of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the Fourth Amendment (Halloran, 2006). The Administration and the NSA representatives defended that the case be dropped on the grounds that it violated “state secretsâ€. This weighted card, when enacted, generally deals a crippling blow to the challenger—as in most cases for the last fifty years, the judiciary has unequivocally sided with this executive privilege (Weinstein, 2006). As stated in U.S. vs. Reynolds, “state secrets†can be exacted wherever the disclosure of information in a court proceeding renders “a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulgedâ€. U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor ruled against this privilege. She trumped the “state secret†card with rhetoric that extended well before “U.S. vs. Reynoldsâ€, by arguing that the United States gives birth to “no hereditary Kings…â€, and that the Chief Executive office exists of the Constitution, and of “no powers not created by the Constitution.†(Meyer, 2006).
Both sides were very quick to spin this argument for their own benefit. The defending face of the Administration has been Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. He expressed disappointment at the ruling and publicly stated the intent of the administration to continue with the appeal, ensuring the continuation of the program until further deliberation scheduled for September 2006 with the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Rash, 2006). “I believe very strongly, that the president does have the authority to authorize this kind of conduct… and we believe the authority comes from the authorization to use military force and from his constitutional authority as commander in chiefâ€, Gonzales defended. The Administration then reverted back to Congress’s “Authorization of Use of Military Force†in 2001, immediately following the 9/11 attacks, stating that it directly granted the President of the United States the authority to authorize warrentless surveillance, provided the acts did not violate the Constitution
(Halloran, 2006). The text itself in the joint resolution is ambiguous, and though not specifically stated, it is easy to note where the argument for this kind of authority could be derived. One paragraph in particular, grants the authority of the President to “take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizationsâ€, which loosely interpreted could include surveillance for the purpose of preventing future attacks (Public Law 107-243; 107th Congress).
Though this is largely a partisan issue, members of congress have been united on the fact that they do not like being kept out of the loop. Even Republican supporters of the Bush Administration have expressed irritation and concern. Representative Peter Hoeskra, a Republican from Michigan and the chairman of the House Permanent Selection Committee on Intelligence, wrote to the White House that he had become aware of these intelligence activities taking place without the briefing of his committee. Using harsh rhetoric, he warns that "If these allegations are true, they may represent a breach of responsibility by the administration, a violation of the law and, just as importantly, a direct affront to me and the members of this committee who have so ardently supported efforts to collect information on our enemies†(Meyer, 2006). Even those responsible for supporting and even crafting these surveillance programs are skeptical at the amount of secrecy, and while criticism is abundant, public defense for this program is coming primarily from the highest levels of the Administration.
Greater technologies have introduced a profound need for new kinds of security, but to what degree should that security be carried out? Many will point to the warnings of George Orwell and the inherent dangers when the reign of “big brother†goes unchecked. Others will note the responsibility of our Government to live up to the social contract by protecting us in a world of enveloping terrorism and anti-American sentiment. Still the means by which information is gathered has been questioned by a weary public, a critical international community, and a deepening distain and mistrust here and abroad. Plato etched in history a question that is as prominent and alive today as it was then. As this debate unfolds it will continue to be the responsibility of this generation, and the next, to strive for balance within this delicate and complicated ethical pendulum of individual privacy and the security of the masses.
Sources
Hook, S.W (2005). U.S. Foreign Policy; The paradox of world power. Washington, D.C.:CQ Press.
Forester, T, & Morrison, P (1994). Computer ethics; Cautionary tales and ethical dilemmas in computing. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The MIT Press.
Meyer, J (2006, September 11). Five years after; hidden depths to U.S. monitoring. Los Angeles Times, p. A12.
Weinstein, H (2006, June 12). Domestic spying program comes under legal scrutiny. Los Angeles Times, p. A5.
Davidson, P (2006, May 16). National Security Agency's use of phone records; winning lawsuits may be difficult. USA Today, p. 1B.Rash, W (2006, August 18). Federal Court Finds NSA Wiretaps Unconstitutional.EWeek.com,
Halloran, L (2006, August 28). A win for spying opponents. U.S. News & World Report
Weisman, J Wiretap bill moves closer to passage; after changes, senate holdouts pledge support. (2006, September 26). The Washington Post, p. A03.
Brune, T (2006, September 14). Panel OKs wiretapping bill. Newsday Washington Bureau, p. A25.
Richelson, J (2005, March 11). The National Security Agency declassified. National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 24, Retrieved September 16, 2006, from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB24/index.htm
Cauley, L (2006, September 5). NSA has massive database of Americans' phone calls.
USA Today, Wasington/Politics, Retrieved September 15, 2006, from http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm
Bamford, J (2001). Body of secrets; Anatomy of the ultra-secret National Security Agency
from the Cold War through the dawn of a new century. New York, NY: Doubleday; a division of Random House, Inc..
Lewis, L, & Brown, R.A & Schrader, J. Y (2005). Top to bottom and end to end; Improving the National Security Agency's strategic decision process. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
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National Security Agency; the Fight for Domestic Spying
By Daniel J. Porter
Every hour millions of transmissions make their way across our borders. In a millisecond any person from the warmth of their living room can converse with another on the opposite side of the globe, be it by cell phone, instant message, email or chatroom; technological advancements have created a world more interconnected than our ancestors could have ever imagined. As with every new technological breakthrough, the tools available today have the potential for great things—from connecting families separated by oceans and ensuring the safety of American troops to coordinating the execution of a terrorist bombing. The tool itself is without a moral compass, while its potential for destruction is readily accepted in the name of advancement. Clearly the need for regulation and protection exists, but at what point does the moderation become an infringement on an individual’s fundamental right to privacy? The role of intelligence agencies in a world confounded by the threat of terrorism creates the need to distinguish between the fine line of protection, and violation. The role of the National Security Agency has been questioned, and it appears a tug of war between critics of domestic spying and the Bush Administration may be in a stalemate that will inevitably find itself on the steps of the Supreme Court.
The mission is daunting, and it is stretched across the “NSA.gov†homepage, both for the comfort of the casual American and the warning to the potential enemy abroad. It projects a bold and clear mission statement; “[we have] The ability to understand the secret communications of our foreign adversaries while protecting our own communications -- a capability in which the United States leads the world...â€. Officially established five years after the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been improving ways to tackle this assignment for over half a century. Under a shroud of secrecy, the NSA enjoyed a place in foreign policy far away from the media’s limelight for many years; the U.S. Government and respective administrations publicly denied its very existence. Officials would even joke that the acronym stood for “No Such Agency†(Cauley, 2006). In recent years, however, media attention and public interest surrounding the now partially “declassified†agency has been substantial, as the NSA lives up to its vital role in the post-September 11th “War on Terrorismâ€.
The very beginnings of the agency date back to 1949 when the “Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)†was created and given jurisdiction over the “regulation of communications and electronic intelligence†(Richelson, 2005). The goal was to create an agency that would, in theory, coordinate the electronic intelligence and digital communications of the Armed Services (included under this umbrella was the Army Security Agency, The Naval Security Group and the Air Force Security Service). In practice, a lack of central command structure and internal competition rendered the AFSA fundamentally ineffective. This refusal (or arguably an inherent inability) to share information led to so much confusion during the Korean War that CIA director Walter Bedell Smith surrendered the issue directly to the National Security Council. This led to the creation of the NSA in 1952 (Bamford, 2001). By its very name, this expansion of the new program would stretch well beyond military intelligence—unifying these branches of cryptology and communications into one cohesive and highly secretive central agency.
Well before the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the NSA had been utilizing its surveillance programs to track rising threats in the War on Drugs and the impending War on Terrorism. Tapping into phones, computers and bank accounts was necessary to track terrorist cells and drug rackets to their very core. It is important to realize that the increasing escalation of technology that works to expand governmental surveillance power is often counterbalanced by equally innovative disruptive technologies and innovations by terrorists and drug traffickers. The improvement of scramblers and encryption methods are on the constant agenda of those who wish to elude government intelligence agencies (Forester & Morrison, 1994). The inherent defense is clear. If agencies like the NSA are straight-jacketed while their enemies continue their innovation unchecked, it is argued that dampening the NSA’s scope of surveillance in the name of public privacy carries with it a price tag of American vulnerability.
This is where the heart of the controversy begins, though it is hardly a modern one. In “The Republicâ€, Plato raises a question without conclusion, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes, which translates from Latin as, “Who will guard the guardians?â€. This question has rippled throughout history and remained largely unanswered, while the debate is as prominent as it was centuries ago.
Just as the ancients recorded the warnings of their greatest philosophers, our generation is certainly not void of thinkers who do the same. Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Ron Wyden argue that behind this shroud of secrecy “there is no guarantee that the most basic of freedoms will be preserved.†They continue in their report, “…the great fear we have for our democracy is the enveloping culture of government secrecy and the corresponding distrust of government that follows.†It is crucial to note, however, that the argument of public trust has not been lost on the NSA. National Security Director Michael V. Hayden contributes, “The American people have to trust us, and in order to trust us, they have to know about usâ€, recognizing the belief that the people of a nation have both the right, and the responsibility, to “watch its government closely and keep it on the right track†(Bamford, 2001).
One piece at a time, the shroud of secrecy that the NSA enjoyed was scratched away by Congressional hearings and other kinds of investigations into surveillance practices. The late 1990s brought criticism that the NSA had failed to adapt to the demands of “post-Cold War†technologies, and they were largely criticized for running a “global surveillance network†that people feared was affecting the individual privacies of people, not only in the United States, but around the globe (Richelson, 2005).
The tension in the domestic spying debate was amplified after September 11th, when the Bush Administration’s “War on Terrorism†hinged on the surveillance of all transmissions going in and out of the United States. Phone calls and voicemails became fair game for government spying. Agencies seized anything from bank accounts and credit card transactions, to scanning school records and library cards; many speculate that “predictive software†is being installed and run in government supercomputers, where mass amounts of personal data and associations are utilized to predict whether a person is likely to become a terrorist (Meyer, 2006). One thing is certain: Americans are largely skeptical about the role government has taken in the aftermath of 9/11 and many have become concerned that provisions in the US Patriot Act have granted the Executive Branch too much power without limitations and balance. It is no surprise that many of these provisions were initially supported by Congress, whose tendency to rally behind the President in times of crisis is anything but atypical. The wake of September 11th granted more than enough permission for the administration to take advantage and enhance these programs exponentially, forcing many critics in congress to be critical retrospectively (Hook, 2005).
One of the most prominent actors in the fight against the NSA’s domestic spying program is the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In June 2006, the ACLU represented several individuals who claimed they were being spied on by the US Government. Their argument maintained that the tapping of phone calls and obtaining of emails (including suspected terrorist affiliates) intentionally circumvented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—a court specifically created in the 1970s to avoid this kind of spying without judicial approval (Weinstein, 2006). The actual clients and their claims of victimization were largely irrelevant, because the ACLU argued that the previous public admittance by the administration of the program’s existence was enough to make a ruling on its constitutionality. They instead argued that the program was in direct violation of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the Fourth Amendment (Halloran, 2006). The Administration and the NSA representatives defended that the case be dropped on the grounds that it violated “state secretsâ€. This weighted card, when enacted, generally deals a crippling blow to the challenger—as in most cases for the last fifty years, the judiciary has unequivocally sided with this executive privilege (Weinstein, 2006). As stated in U.S. vs. Reynolds, “state secrets†can be exacted wherever the disclosure of information in a court proceeding renders “a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulgedâ€. U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor ruled against this privilege. She trumped the “state secret†card with rhetoric that extended well before “U.S. vs. Reynoldsâ€, by arguing that the United States gives birth to “no hereditary Kings…â€, and that the Chief Executive office exists of the Constitution, and of “no powers not created by the Constitution.†(Meyer, 2006).
Both sides were very quick to spin this argument for their own benefit. The defending face of the Administration has been Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. He expressed disappointment at the ruling and publicly stated the intent of the administration to continue with the appeal, ensuring the continuation of the program until further deliberation scheduled for September 2006 with the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Rash, 2006). “I believe very strongly, that the president does have the authority to authorize this kind of conduct… and we believe the authority comes from the authorization to use military force and from his constitutional authority as commander in chiefâ€, Gonzales defended. The Administration then reverted back to Congress’s “Authorization of Use of Military Force†in 2001, immediately following the 9/11 attacks, stating that it directly granted the President of the United States the authority to authorize warrentless surveillance, provided the acts did not violate the Constitution
(Halloran, 2006). The text itself in the joint resolution is ambiguous, and though not specifically stated, it is easy to note where the argument for this kind of authority could be derived. One paragraph in particular, grants the authority of the President to “take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizationsâ€, which loosely interpreted could include surveillance for the purpose of preventing future attacks (Public Law 107-243; 107th Congress).
Though this is largely a partisan issue, members of congress have been united on the fact that they do not like being kept out of the loop. Even Republican supporters of the Bush Administration have expressed irritation and concern. Representative Peter Hoeskra, a Republican from Michigan and the chairman of the House Permanent Selection Committee on Intelligence, wrote to the White House that he had become aware of these intelligence activities taking place without the briefing of his committee. Using harsh rhetoric, he warns that "If these allegations are true, they may represent a breach of responsibility by the administration, a violation of the law and, just as importantly, a direct affront to me and the members of this committee who have so ardently supported efforts to collect information on our enemies†(Meyer, 2006). Even those responsible for supporting and even crafting these surveillance programs are skeptical at the amount of secrecy, and while criticism is abundant, public defense for this program is coming primarily from the highest levels of the Administration.
Greater technologies have introduced a profound need for new kinds of security, but to what degree should that security be carried out? Many will point to the warnings of George Orwell and the inherent dangers when the reign of “big brother†goes unchecked. Others will note the responsibility of our Government to live up to the social contract by protecting us in a world of enveloping terrorism and anti-American sentiment. Still the means by which information is gathered has been questioned by a weary public, a critical international community, and a deepening distain and mistrust here and abroad. Plato etched in history a question that is as prominent and alive today as it was then. As this debate unfolds it will continue to be the responsibility of this generation, and the next, to strive for balance within this delicate and complicated ethical pendulum of individual privacy and the security of the masses.
Sources
Hook, S.W (2005). U.S. Foreign Policy; The paradox of world power. Washington, D.C.:CQ Press.
Forester, T, & Morrison, P (1994). Computer ethics; Cautionary tales and ethical dilemmas in computing. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The MIT Press.
Meyer, J (2006, September 11). Five years after; hidden depths to U.S. monitoring. Los Angeles Times, p. A12.
Weinstein, H (2006, June 12). Domestic spying program comes under legal scrutiny. Los Angeles Times, p. A5.
Davidson, P (2006, May 16). National Security Agency's use of phone records; winning lawsuits may be difficult. USA Today, p. 1B.Rash, W (2006, August 18). Federal Court Finds NSA Wiretaps Unconstitutional.EWeek.com,
Halloran, L (2006, August 28). A win for spying opponents. U.S. News & World Report
Weisman, J Wiretap bill moves closer to passage; after changes, senate holdouts pledge support. (2006, September 26). The Washington Post, p. A03.
Brune, T (2006, September 14). Panel OKs wiretapping bill. Newsday Washington Bureau, p. A25.
Richelson, J (2005, March 11). The National Security Agency declassified. National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 24, Retrieved September 16, 2006, from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB24/index.htm
Cauley, L (2006, September 5). NSA has massive database of Americans' phone calls.
USA Today, Wasington/Politics, Retrieved September 15, 2006, from http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm
Bamford, J (2001). Body of secrets; Anatomy of the ultra-secret National Security Agency
from the Cold War through the dawn of a new century. New York, NY: Doubleday; a division of Random House, Inc..
Lewis, L, & Brown, R.A & Schrader, J. Y (2005). Top to bottom and end to end; Improving the National Security Agency's strategic decision process. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
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